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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark A. Person appeals from the order granting the Respondent's motion
for summary dismissal, which resulted in the dismissal of his post-conviction
relief petition by the district court. (R., 83-84.) Specifically, Person challenges
the dismissal of his petition on the ground that it was time barred. (Appellant's
brief, p. 3.)
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
Person entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on August 20,
2002. Following the preparation of a presentence report, he was given a unified
life sentence with 20 years fixed. State v. Person, 140 ldaho 934, 936, 104 P.3d
976, 978 (Ct. App. 2004). On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
portions of Person's statements to the police during interrogation should have
been suppressed pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Person,
140 ldaho at 941-942, 104 P.3d at 983-984 (Ct. App. 2004).
On remand, Person entered a binding plea agreement with a
recommended sentence of a unified 50 years with 15 fixed. State v. Person, 145
ldaho 293, 295, 178 P.3d 658, 660 (Ct. App. 2007).

No new presentence

investigation was performed before this sentencing by agreement of the parties.
Id.
-

A judgment of conviction was entered on September 12, 2005.

id.

On October 31, 2005, Person filed a motion to correct a clerical error
(Idaho Court Rules 32 and 36), seeking to have copies of the PSI returned from
IDOC, and kept out of their files, or, in the alternative, to have all copies of the

PSI returned to redact any statements found to have been obtained in violation of
Miranda.

Id.

The district court denied the motion on the ground that, while the

court agreed that the statements were excludable, Rule 32 does not provide the
court with the authority permitting it to redact information from a pre-existing
document generated by a separate agency.

Id. at 295, 178 P.3d at 660-63.

The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling.

a. at 295-96, 178

P.2d at 660-63.
On February 27, 2007, Person filed a QZS~

petition for post-conviction

t seq. (R., pp. 5-1 1.) He
relief pursuant to ldaho Code Section 19-4901, g
alleged that he had ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the entry
of the second Rule 11 plea, resulting in an invalid plea. (R. pp. 8-9.) Person also
alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel allegedly
failed to advise him as to the correct time calculations on the running of the
statute of limitations for post-conviction relief purposes.

Id.

The Office of the Attorney General was appointed as a special prosecutor.
(R. p. 34.) The State filed an answer to the petition (R., pp. 40-47), citing a
number of defenses, perhaps most importantly that the petition was time-barred
(R., p. 46). The State asserted that the unappealed underlying conviction was
entered on September 5, 2005, after the second plea was given; the one-year
time limit for the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief began 42 days later,
or October 17, 2005, and ran through October 17, 2006; and, therefore, the
petition filed in 2007 was untimely. (R., p. 46.)

The State then filed a motion and brief in support of summary dismissal.
(R. pp. 48-49, 53-71.)

A hearing was held at the district court level, the

Honorable Joel D. Horton presiding, and the case was summarily dismissed on
the ground that the petition was time-barred. (R., pp.83-84, Tr., p. 12, 1s. 3-15.)

ISSUE
Person states the issue on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court commit fundamental error in dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred on the claim that
counsel was ineffective in negotiating an unenforceable plea
agreement when the claim was filed well within a year of when the
ineffective assistance was and could have reasonably been
discovered?

(Appellant's brief, p. 2.)
The State rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Person failed to show error in the court order dismissing Person's petition for
post-conviction relief because it was time-barred?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissina Person's Petition For PostConviction Relief Because It Was Time-Barred
A.

Introduction
The district court correctly applied the law in dismissing Person's petition

for post-conviction relief as being time-barred. Pursuant to ldaho Code Section
19-4902(a) this Court should affirm the lower court in the dismissal of the postconviction relief petition
B.

Standard of Review
The Court of Appeals set forth the standard of review, for cases in this

posture, in Martinez v. Idaho, 130 ldaho 530, 944 P.2d 127 (1997), as follows:
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction
application without an evidentiary hearing, we will
determine whether a genuine and material issue of
fact is demonstrated in the record and whether one
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . .
In evaluating a post-conviction claim for summary
disposition, the court assumes the truth of the
applicant's allegations of fact. . . . Therefore, we must
address only whether, assuming the truth of the facts
alleged by Martinez, his claims are time-barred. Our
review of the district court's construction and
application of the limitation statute is a matter of free
review.
Id., at 532, 944 P.2d at 129 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Dismissing Person's Petition For PostConviction Relief Because It Was Time Barred.
In this instance, the focus is on the threshold issue of whether the

application was timely filed. A Petitioner must file his post-conviction petition

"within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal . . .

.'I

ldaho Code

Section 19-4902(a). An appeal must be filed within 42 days of entry of judgment.
I.A.R. 14(a). Failure to file the petition within one year and forty two days from
entry of judgment is grounds for dismissal of the petition.

See Savas v. State,

139 ldaho 957, 959, 99 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003) (failure to file a timely
petition is grounds for dismissal).
Here, according to the record, Person filed his petition for post-conviction
relief on March 7, 2007. (R., pp. 5-11; Tr., pp. 12, L. 3-15, 24-25, p. 13, L.l-4; R.,
pp 83-84.) The district court found that the "petition was filed more than one year
and 42 days after the date of the filing of the final judgment," and was therefore
time-barred.
Person impliedly concedes that the petition for post-conviction relief was
not filed more than one year and 42 days after the date of the filing of the
unappealed judgment. Instead, Person argues that the district court committed
fundamental error by not sua sponte applying a discovery exception and finding
the petition timely.

(Appellant's brief, p.3.) Person's argument fails for two

reasons. First, the argument was not preserved, in this case, at the district court
level. Second, under ldaho law, there is no discovery exception to the time limit
of ldaho Code Section 19-4902(a).
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). It is equally
well settled that the appellate court "will not 'review a trial court's alleged error on

appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the basis for
an assignment of error."' State v. Barnes, 113 ldaho 378, 384, 987 P.2d 290,
296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 ldaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942, 946
(1993)). See also, State v. Grube, 126 ldaho 377, 387, 883 P.2d 1069, 1079
(1994). Whether an issue was preserved presents a "threshold" inquiry. State v.
Stevens, 115 ldaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at
trial on other grounds did not preserve issue raised on appeal).
Person did not argue to the district court that a "discovery exception" to
I.C. § 19-4902(a) was allowed by law or was applicable on the facts. Rather,
Person argued that inaccurate advice by his appellate attorney on his second
appeal should toll the running of the statute of limitation. (Tr., p. 6, L. 4 - p. 7, L.
6.) The district judge ruled on the only tolling argument before it, rejecting it.
(Tr., p. 12, L. 16 - p. 13, L. 4.) Thus, Person neither made a claim for application
of a "discovery exception" nor did he obtain an adverse ruling. In short, this issue
is not preserved for appeal.
Person, however, claims that the error was fundamental, and therefore a
claim he may raise without having raised it to the district court or obtained an
adverse ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3, 6-7.) The ldaho Supreme Court has
defined fundamental error as error that:
(1) goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights, (2) goes
to the foundation of a case, or (3) takes from the defendant a right
which was essential to the defendant's defense which no court
could or ought to permit the defendant to waive.

State v. Babb, 125 ldaho 934, 941, 877 P.2d 905, 912 (1994). Application of a
"discovery exception" does not meet this definition.
As set forth in more detail below, Person has cited to no case that holds
that a defendant has any right whatsoever to application of a "discovery
exception." Although application of the statute of limitations may result in
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, Person has not shown that application of a
"discovery exception" goes to the foundation of his case. Finally, because
Person would have the burden of factually proving his discovery exception, and
he presented no evidence whatsoever of when he did or could have learned
about his claim, Person cannot credibly claim that the district court should have
ruled on the matter sua sponte. Person has therefore failed to show that
application of a "discovery exception" is so fundamental that the district court's
failure to rule on it sua sponte was fundamental error.
Even if the merits of the claim were preserved, Person has failed to show
that, under ldaho law, there is a "discovery exception" to ldaho Code Section 194902. in Evensioskv v. Idaho, 136 ldaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d 967, 969 (2001), the
ldaho Supreme Court expressly stated that, "There is no discovery exception in
I.C. Section 19-4902, and the facts of this case do not warrant application of a

discovery exception. 1.C. Section 4902 expressly limits a party's time to bring a
claim for post-conviction review to one year."

Id. at

191, 30 P.3d at 969

(emphasis added).
Here, Person asserts that he is entitled to an exception to the statutory
time limit of one-year and forty-two days on the ground that he did not know that

the Department of Correction retained the PSI and that he did not find this out
until after the time period had run.'

Person does not cite any cases actually

applying a "discovery exception" under ldaho Code Section 19-4902(a).
(Appellant's brief, pp. 4-6 (citing cases that do not actually apply a discovery
exception).) To the contrary, the ldaho Supreme Court has rejected application
of a "discovery exception" to ldaho Code Section 19-4902(a). Evensiosky, 136
ldaho at 191, 30 P.3d at 969.
The district court concluded Person filed his petition after the limitation
period of ldaho Code Section 19-4902(a) had run.
challenged on appeal.

This conclusion is not

Instead, Person claims the district court should have

applied a "discovery exception." This argument fails as it was not preserved.
Even if preserved it fails because ldaho Code Section 19-4902(a) contains no
"discovery exception," express or implied.

Finally, even if preserved and

applicable, the argument fails because Person presented no evidence of when
he dismissed the facts supporting his cause of action.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order.
DATED this 24th day of October 2008.

'

As noted above, Person did not present any evidence to the district court of when he learned,
or should have learned, that the Department of Correction had a copy of the PSI, which was
prepared by one of its employees.
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